Bullpens are but one facet of a big-league baseball team, but in the contemporary version of baseball, no area of a club is under a bigger microscope.
The Royals are 4-5 on the season. It's not hard to imagine that record being 8-1, at least in a perfect world where the skies are always blue and Jack's Stack is served at The K. The Royals have had the lead at some point in four of their five losses. In three of them, they had leads of two runs or more and in all three of those games, they lost the lead in the seventh inning or later.
The Royals' leaky bullpen has undermined a not-horrible start for the offense, which leads the American League in batting average. There a lot of Fool's Gold in those offensive numbers--another topic--but, nevertheless, KC is fourth in the league in runs per game. The rotation has also been solid, posting a middle-of-the-pack, fielding-independent ERA despite the terrible outing posted by the ailing Gil Meche. (I don't have any special insight into Meche's physical condition, but if something isn't wrong with his arm, then something is wrong with his approach.) The defense has been terrible--again, another topic--but the point here is this: With a good showing by the relief staff, the Royals could have created a positive buzz in their home ballpark by now.
In the past, Royals general manager Dayton Moore has shared with me his philosophy in building a bullpen. Think of the middle relief staff as one pitcher. He tries to construct a group of players that combine to be the most complete pitcher one can imagine. It throws with both hands. It has power stuff, but also the ability to change speeds. It misses bats but also pitches to contact. It can keep the ball in the air in a spacious stadium, but induce a groundball when one is called for. It throws every pitch in the book. The middlemen provide the manager with every option there is to bridge the game between starter and closer.
I'm not exactly sure how the makeup of the current staff fits that philosophy. I'm not sure the staff fits
any philosophy. Some of that is bad luck. Some of that is poor planning. The end result is a complete muddle. Other than closer Joakim Soria, there is not one relief pitcher on the staff that has successfully filled any type of bullpen role. Most of the explanation of that is poor performance. Part of it is mismanagement. Still another piece of the puzzle is an apparent disconnect between the way manager Trey Hillman deploys his bullpen from the way Moore constructs it.
Consider the differences in bullpen management between Hillman and Braves manager Bobby Cox, whom Moore surely sees as the model big-league skipper after his own long career working in Atlanta's organization. Last season, Hillman was near the bottom of the major leagues in using relievers on consecutive days, while no manager used relievers in back-to-back situations more often than Cox. Just two managers had fewer overall relief appearances than Hillman because of his distaste for specialization in the pen. Just four teams averaged longer relief outings than KC's 1.12 innings per appearance; just three teams had shorter outings than the 0.97 inn/app. figure posted by the Braves. The Royals' figure was high despite the fact that only the Nationals had a worse team bullpen ERA.
In a baseball philosophy sense, there really isn't a right or wrong in whether a manager relies on one-inning relievers or swaps pitchers according to matchups. There are plenty of successful bullpens on both sides of the ledger. In the Royals' case, we know something is wrong. Either the wrong pitchers are on the roster, the pitchers on the roster are being used incorrectly or, most likely, it's a little of both. It's easy to say Hillman should have anointed pitchers for specific roles in the spring and stuck to it, but if the relievers aren't succeeding in those roles, you have to be ready to adjust.
That brings us to Luis Mendoza. Two days before the end of spring training, Moore plucked Mendoza from the Rangers for a little cash. Mendoza wasn't going to make Texas' roster and is out of options, so the Royals grabbed him before he hit the waiver wire. Mendoza's case illustrates perfectly the Royals' tendency to overvalue the opinions of their scouts against the indisputable facts found on the stats sheet.
Mendoza's got a live arm. He throws in the lower- to mid- 90s and has a nice sinker. He was Texas' 24th-ranked prospect by Baseball America in 2008. The publication cited his "rubber arm and durable frame" but also said he is "very reliant on strong infield defense" and that his "ceiling is limited." He entered the season with a career 8.32 ERA in big-league 83.1 innings to go with his 4.58 ERA in eight minor-league seasons. He strikes out barely one batter every other inning. Despite being a sinker specialist, his groundball-to-flyball ratios are barely adequate and he's given up too many home runs. But he's got that live arm, so the Royals were willing to take a flier. He made the Opening Day roster.
On April 8, the third game of the season and just five days after he first stepped foot in the Royals clubhouse, Hillman inserted Mendoza in the eighth inning to protect a one-run lead. At the time, all of Hillman's relievers were more or less available, though Soria had thrown to six batters the day before. Mendoza allowed five runs. Somehow, despite Mendoza's track record of ineffectiveness, Hillman had become convinced that he was the guy to bridge the gap to Soria. Two days later, Mendoza entered a close game against Boston and gave up three runs--and two homers--in five batters faced, turning the contest into a rout.
When faced with bullpen dilemmas, the managers usually opt for veterans first, but whatever. There is no denying the fact that no matter which bullpen lever Hillman pulls right now, it's probably going to be the wrong one. There are no right answers outside of Joakim Soria. At the same time, it's hard to review his use of Mendoza in high-leverage spots and come away believing that he's valuing the right things. Mendoza has an ERA of 24.00, but just two Royals relievers have faced more batters. Mendoza has faced three more batters than Soria.
Hillman needs to become more adept at matching relievers with situations. He needs to be more willing to use multiple relievers to get through an inning, giving his bullpen management style the LaRussa treatment, so to speak. Meanwhile, Moore needs to keep shuffling. Middle relievers are the chattel of the baseball world. There are plenty of them around but few of them are reliable. Mendoza fails? Send him out. Blake Wood had an excellent spring, let's see what he can do. This is also exactly why giving expensive, multi-year deals to middle relievers is almost always a bad idea. Doing so last year has further hamstrung Hillman because he now must continue to hope against hope that Kyle Farnsworth and Juan Cruz will emerge as the bridge guys they were signed to be.
During Moore's first two seasons in Kansas City, when Buddy Bell was still managing, he did a pretty solid job of piecing together bullpens. He also seemed to understand the fungible nature of relievers when he traded away Ramon Ramirez and Leo Nunez, though the return on both has turned out to be less than ideal. Still, he's shown a knack for crafting a relief staff in the past, so there is hope he can do it again once the team finally pulls the plug on last year's mistakes. However, if Moore can rebuild a bullpen according to the philosophy he has espoused in the past, Hillman still must demonstrate the ability to manage it.
Even if the "ifs and whens" of the bullpen scenario are smoothed over, that doesn't do anything for the short term. The Royals have already missed a chance to get off to a great start in a division that looked mediocre entering the season and remains thus, with the exception being the Twins, who look like a team capable of running away with things. The Royals could be sitting on a great start, rather than a not-as-terrible-as-we-thought start. The buzz at Kauffman Stadium could be one of excited anticipation, rather than the old familiar hum of nervous dread.